There are four competing philosophical theories of the parental role, only one of which is sound and compatible with libertarian principles. Rather than adopting the one correct theory, unfortunately Walter Block, chose to combine the three unsound theories in his own theory of the parental role.
A Summary of Block's Theory
Here is a summary of Block's theory:
- Parents have no positive obligations to their children.
- If one becomes a parent, one is homesteading a special kind of limited ownership of a child as a property right.
- Taking on this property right over the child makes parents bound by various rules that govern homesteading and abandonment, including a rule that parents must care for the child (not neglect him) whilst they have ownership of him.
- If the parents fail to care for the child whilst they have ownership of him, they are committing the crime of forestalling against other people who might be interested in acquiring this property right in the child.
- Parents can give up a child whenever they want- they are “free to dump him out” as Block puts it, but only if they notify all other potentially interested parties first so that other parties have the opportunity to take over ownership. Failing to notify is again to commit the forestalling crime against other potential owners.
Block's Contradiction
Block's theory of the parental role starts out by building on Rothbards' ideas on this topic. Like Rothbard, Block defends both the theory of parenting as charity (arguing that parents do not have positive obligations) and the add-on variant of the theory of parental ownership (arguing for parental authority as a homesteaded property right).
At this point Block departs from Rothbard because he is unwilling to accept the permissibility of negligence implied by the theory of parenting as charity. Rothbard famously acknowledged that since parents have no positive obligations, there is nothing to stop them starving their children to death.
So Block has two mutually contradictory claims:
- He wants to keep Rothbard's claim that parents have no positive obligations.
- Yet at the same time he wants to claim that parental negligence is illegitimate.
How does he resolve the contradiction?
Smuggling In Positive Obligations
Block asserts that parents cannot legitimately withhold care from children because to do so would be committing a kind of forestalling against other potential caregivers. His justification involves an appeal to his conception of the rules of homesteading and the rules that determine what constitutes abandonment. His denial that any positive obligations are implied in his theory is not a sustainable claim.
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Block himself does argue for positive parental obligations, but he does so in an extremely circuitous way. Ultimately, his argument amounts to this: as part of becoming a parent, you voluntarily take on an obligation to care for your children, because (according to Block) you are homesteading a child and this makes you bound by various rules governing homesteading and abandonment.
Obligations to Society, Not The Child
Since Block argues that parents don't owe their children anything, but also that parents are obliged to look after their children, there must be some other party to whom a parent is obligated to if they have an obligation to care for their child.
To whom do parents owe this obligation to care for their child whilst they "own him", according to Block? The positive obligation that Block is arguing for is an obligation is to the rest of society—to every other person on planet earth who might otherwise want to raise the child—and not to the child.
In making this argument, Block is invoking a variant of social contract theory as the basis of voluntary parental obligations. Whereas Horwitz puts forward a social contract argument plainly, Block uses extremely convoluted arguments that ultimately reach the same destination, while simultaneously denying that he has done any such thing.
Motivated Reasoning
In a footnote of one of his articles, Block provides an insight into his motivations:
If it came to it, I would rather concoct an implicit contractual obligation that arises out of land ownership to notify of abandonment, than to concede that there is a positive obligation to notify, and I would prefer to do either than allow it to be legal that the mother could starve the baby without notification.
Here Block shows his motivated reasoning: he begins with the conclusions he wants (no parental obligations, no neglect) and is willing to "concoct" whatever argument will deliver them. He goes on to argue that "happily, it does not come down to this" as he thinks his theory provides these results without him having to force them. He doesn't seem to realise that this is exactly what he has done.
A Better Alternative: Causal Parental Responsibility
The irony is that if Block adopted the theory of causal parental responsibility, he would get what he wanted without all the convoluted and false arguments that he had to make to get his combination of three false theories to work.
Defending Against Welfare Claims
Block wants to defend against the claims of socialists for positive obligations like welfare, so he thinks he has to deny that there are ever any legitimate positive obligations (including parental obligations). But causal parental responsibility does not entail general welfare obligations because the justification of parental obligations is specific, not general. Also, the justification is based on responsibility for an individual’s own actions, not some general responsibility for humanity arising from membership of the human race.
Without contradiction, we can both acknowledge the validity of chosen positive obligations (including those obligations one must accept as “chosen” as a consequence of one’s actions) and deny the validity of unchosen positive obligations.
Justifying Parental Authority
Block wants to legitimise parents having authority to look after their children, so he argues for a false property right in children with all the errors that this entails. Causal parental responsibility provides a justification for parental authority without appealing to parental ownership.
Denying The Legitimacy of Negligence
Block wants to deny the validity of parental negligence, so he appeals to a false obligation to other potential "owners" to get this result. But causal parental responsibility provides clear grounds for denying the validity of negligence without appealing to a social contract.
The Wrong Starting Point
Block mistakenly thinks that he must deny parental obligations in order to save libertarianism from the argument for welfare. This false premise led him to construct elaborate arguments to deny obligations while simultaneously rejecting the logical consequences of doing so. The result is a conceptual mess.
Motivated reasoning is unsound. If it were true that parental obligations are valid and truly imply general welfare obligations, then consistency would require us to accept welfare too. One cannot deny a truth on the grounds that it refutes a theory that one holds dear. However, they do not. Parental obligations are valid and they do not entail welfare obligations.
By denying parental obligations outright, Block set his project on a false path. The theory of causal parental responsibility achieves Block's goals of grounding parental authority and denying the legitimacy of negligence without resorting to incoherence or contradiction.