One theory of parental obligations holds that the biological relatedness of parent to child is the basis for parental obligations. This view holds that parents have enforceable positive obligations simply because they are biological parents. In his article Abortion and Parental Obligation, Andrew J. Peach makes this argument citing Stephen Schwarz's book The Moral Question of Abortion:
Following Schwarz, then, I will be defending the theses that the being in the womb is a person from conception and that, contrary to Thomson, parents simply by virtue of the biological relationship do have a special responsibility to this being. Although voluntary sexual intercourse is the means by which virtually all conception takes place, Schwarz is arguing that it is the biological bond between parents and children itself that grounds the obligation. In other words, the act of sexual intercourse is not in itself the ground of the obligation; it is merely the act that brought about the existence of the child who is biologically connected to the parents. So, it is not so much the choice to have sex that obligates a couple as it is the reality, the relationship, that is brought about by that choice.
Peach argues in a footnote that a “biological bond” exists "between the parents as the natural authors of the child—their sperm and egg that unite to form this new human being," and that this bond "is really the crucial one for determining parental obligation."
This is not quite right. Parental obligation arises from the voluntary act of making one's gametes available for fertilization—whether through sexual intercourse, which entails the inherent possibility of fertilization, or through assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF. In both cases, the gamete providers bear ultimate causal responsibility for the creation of a child in a state of peril. Therefore, both the mother and father are causally obligated to remove the child from the state of peril by raising him to the safety of adulthood.
James Lindemann Nelson explains why this act creates causal obligation:
The making available of one's gametes is an act highly proximate to conception, and, in concert with the other parent's actions, is jointly sufficient for it. Our practice is generally to take proximity and sufficiency pretty seriously; a pair of coordinated actions which were proximate to and jointly sufficient for some event, and were not the result of forcing or fraudulent action on the part of others would be hard not to see as the cause of the event in question. Becoming a parent generally fits this model.
Peach is correct that it is not merely the act of sex that creates obligation, but he is mistaken in attributing the obligation to biology alone. It is action that creates parental obligations. Sex involves the act of making one's gametes available for fertilization. Obligation comes from the reasonably foreseeable consequences of this act.
Does a rape victim have parental obligations?
The huge difference between the causal theory and the biological theory is in the question of parental obligations for rape victims. Peach acknowledges an important logical implication of the biological theory:
If the biological bond is the true ground of parental obligations, then women who are raped also have maternal obligations because, as a point of fact, they are mothers; the same biological bond exists between the woman and child in the case of rape as exists between a woman and child of a voluntary conception. As Schwarz explains in regard to the woman who has conceived due to rape: “The child is her child; this remains true even when the child is conceived in violent intercourse and forced on her. The reality of the child as a person, and as entrusted to the woman as her mother, remains fully intact. The woman may not get rid of the child if this means child neglect, still less if it means killing, as in abortion.”
There is a lot to unpack here. Firstly, there are two arguments at stake:
- Does a rape victim have parental obligations?
- Is abortion justified in cases of rape?
Since Peach and Schwarz are concerned to argue against abortion, they both address these two questions only in connection with each other. But these are two independent questions.
Addressing the first question, unlike the biological theory, the causal theory of parental obligations does not imply that a rape victim has parental obligations. A rape victim did not act to make her gametes available for fertilization; she was coerced into doing so by an invasive act of aggression. Therefore, a rape victim does not have parental obligations to any resultant child.
The case of rape highlights the absence of a compelling argument for the biological theory of obligation. Why should biology alone impose parental obligations in cases of rape? Schwarz and Peach argue that the resulting child is "entrusted to the woman as its mother." The passive voice in "entrusted" leaves unclear who is doing the entrusting. Is it anyone in particular, or society at large, or God? It seems likely that they are making a religious argument.
It is true that abortion is incompatible with parental obligations in cases of consensual sex, but not in cases of rape. However, although a rape victim does not have parental obligations, it does not necessarily follow that abortion is justified in such cases. Peach and Schwarz could argue that abortion is not legitimate in such cases on other grounds. In trying to argue that it is parental obligation which makes abortion impermissible in cases of rape, they are forced to rely on a biological theory of obligation that ultimately lacks any philosophical justification.